What are the Social-Psychological Determinants and Consequences of Conspiracy Ideation? Can it Be Prevented? What Role Does Social Media Play?

 

LITERATURE REVIEW: CONSPIRACY IDEATION (2020)

Conspiracy ideation is social in context and vastly proliferated within social media. The influencing psychological factors are intricate and social consequences detrimental, thus in light of the global coronavirus crisis and accelerating conspiracy theories; research is needed to understand the phenomena. After brief key definitions, this literature review will provide an overview of the cultural and historical aspects of conspiracy ideation and allocate the social representation theory as an explanatory concept. Moreover, social-psychological factors are reviewed, and media influences and communication dynamics examined. Furthermore, social consequences will be outlined, possible ways to refute conspiracy ideation considered, and limitations to the studies involved discussed.

A conspiracy theory (CT) is a reference to a secret plot to control the social and political order by a group of influential persons for their benefit and against the commonweal (Giry, 2017). CTs are manifold ("List of conspiracy theories", 2003). Conspiracy ideation (CI) is the tendency to ascribe aspects of malicious scheming to events and increases the likeliness to believe in one or more CTs (Uscinsky et al., 2017).

Social crises exacerbate conspiracy ideation as rapid societal change impends existing social norms, ecological security, and power structures. CTs are not a modern symptom yet are widespread repetitively in history and not specific to any culture. Van Prooijen and Douglas (2017) state that conspiratorial anti-Semitism has occurred over centuries. Likewise, the industrial revolution (1900) and the beginning of the cold war (1930/1940) had spikes of CI. Most recently, the coronavirus crisis that affects people globally and causes social upheaval has led to an increase in CI (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2020). CTs are an attempt to find answers to uprooting events, specifically by blaming the beginning of a crisis to actors outside their group. These sense-making narratives carry over from generation to generation and can be reawakened with an emerging crisis (Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). In major societal transitions, throughout history, conspiracy plots take hold as a mechanism to alleviate anxiety and to cope.

The social representation theory holds an explanation model for conspiracy ideation. Applying anchoring and objectification to interpret unfamiliar scientific, technological and political information creates perspicuous narratives (Franks et al., 2013), however, often in resistance to expert knowledge (Goertzel, 2010; Lewandowsky et al., 2014). Retrospective beliefs (Moscovici, 2020) are applied to explain intimidating events and threats to one's group by vilifying powerful elites, stigmatised minorities, governments and scientists. As an attempt to manage daunting collective social change, CI frames events using familiar symbols, cultural knowledge, group-inherent worldviews, and other social schemas.

When social change is causing uncertainty, affiliation and a sense of belonging are of importance to many people. Group membership potentially increases conspiracy ideation. Van Prooijen (2015) manipulated a sense of belongingness and measured self-uncertainty and levels of CI concerning NATO and climate change. Results showed that a social inclusion message led to greater CI among those high in self- uncertainty. Conversely, a need to be distinct from others can lead people to have firmer conspiracy beliefs. In a correlational study by Imhoff and Lamberty (2017), results revealed a positive association between the need for uniqueness, general conspiracy mentality, and endorsement of multiple CTs. Lantian et al. (2017) primed participants to raise their sensitivity to feel unique, which resulted in the 'different is better' condition to have stronger conspiracy beliefs. They further found a higher CI correlation when participants were given the perception of knowing rare information. Franks et al. (2017) determined in qualitative semi-structured interviews with CT believers that there is a high sense of community, combined with a sharp differentiation in identification from the outgroup of non-believers. These above studies show that there are distinctive social dimensions and determinants to CI; a need for uniqueness, being different from the crowd, holding confidential information, yet as well as a sense of belonging to the group who is the gatekeeper of secret knowledge.

Social ostracism can trigger a search for meaning. Social isolation, a sense of breakdown or absence of social norms, and powerlessness are likely to encourage conspiracy ideation. Overtly favouring controversial ideas such as CTs carries a social stigma and fosters fear of social exclusion. Moulding et al. (2016) found a correlation between isolation, powerlessness, normlessness and anomie regarding more robust CI about the events of 9/11. They found no relationship towards intolerance of uncertainty; however, strong correlations pointed to conspiracy endorsers seeing the world as an evil place where others conspire against them. Furthermore, CTs have some level of social stigma attached. Lantian et al. (2018) arranged participants to argue in favour of a Charlie Hebdo conspiracy. Pro-conspiracy participants felt increased negative evaluation and anticipated fear of social exclusion, verification of social stigma. Likewise, ecological, racial or minority group exclusion may harbour more definite CI tendencies. Graeupner and Coman (2017) found that exclusion correlated weakly with meaning search and mediated higher superstitious belief about pharmaceutical companies, subliminal government messages and CI about the Bermuda triangle. Overall, social isolation, ostracism and stigma may create vicious cycles for people when feeling excluded further reinforces conspiracy beliefs and leads to more entrenched ideas that nothing is random, other's morals are lacking, and malevolent interrelations of events.

Group membership high in nationalistic ideology and collective narcissism, biased assimilation, and self-affirmative reasoning are mediators for increased conspiracy ideation. Collective narcissism is deeming one's group to be greater than all others; when threatened, aggressive tendencies arise to protect the group's image. A longitudinal correlational study by Golec de Zavala and Federico (2018) analysed the 2016 US-election over five months which was especially prone to conspiracy allegations. The researchers measured conspiracy thinking, collective narcissism and political ideology. Collective narcissism rose over the election and was associated with amplified authoritarianism and increased CI. An us-against-them rationale is also highly conflictive with scientific reasoning. Lewandowsky et al. (2013) analysed the link between CI and science denial, comprising climate science, vaccinations, and genetically modified foods. They found that CI frames scientists as a group that is not to be trusted as they follow dubious agendas to mislead the public, and stunt economic growth and personal freedom. Polarisation, a particular political ideology and when leadership or other elites are attributed unscrupulous motivations, CI finds increasing reasons to elucidate malign connections between events. Self-motivated reasoning and confirmation bias further lock CI in a cycle of argumentation that is nearly impossible to disperse.

Trust and morality are central features of social functionality, and when they are eroding because of increasing ambiguity, the tendency of conspiracy ideation rises. Machiavellianism can be a guide to a person's moral inclinations. Douglas and Sutton (2011) revealed that social projections of Machiavellian motivations, attributions of similar social judgements to others, increased the overall willingness to engage in CI. When primed for reduced-morality, it further increased the inclination to conspire and endorsement of CTs. Van Prooijen and Jostmann (2012) manipulated uncertainty levels in participants and perceptions of morality about oil companies, then measured conspiracy beliefs about the involvement of oil companies in the Iraq war. Morality was a mediating factor for increased CI, yet only in the uncertainty condition. Intriguingly, Jasinskaja‐Lahti and Jetten (2019) found that a firmer, more imperative religious worldview correlated with higher anti-intellectualism and scepticism towards education and science and consequently increased CI. Trust and distrust in the morality of authorities mediate CI in uncertain people and may lead to scapegoating and blaming of institutions or governments. Anti-intellectualism as in guardedness against groups of experts and scholars also increases CI.

Versions of dubious stories, other misinformation and conspiracy theories, in particular, are widely and quickly shared through social media. Exposure to vast amounts of information can create an attentional bottleneck (Hills, 2019); algorithms, confirmation bias, and avoidance of belief-inconsistent communication results from the selective favouritism of media information. Media echo-chambers contribute to one-sided exposure of information and perpetuate CTs. Warner and Neville-
Shepard, R. (2014) exposed participants to an echo-chamber condition and a debunking condition regarding 'Birthers' and 'Truthers' CTs. Effects of echo-chambers revealed a substantial change towards increased conspiracy beliefs. The debunking conditions varied regarding the theories; however, both showed some decrease in CI. Leadership can shape attitude, opinion formation and social behaviours of the greater society. President Trump has tweeted numerous anti-vaccination messages that associated the MMR vaccine with autism. Hornsey et al. (2020) examined that Trump voters were more sceptical towards vaccinations and that experimental exposure to Trump's anti-vaccination tweets led to an increase of immunisation concerns and endorsement of vaccination CTs. Moreover, internet blogs are a staging ground for CI, and negative attitude change can be observed when exposed to messages that seemingly aim to curtail people's freedom. Lewandowsky et al. (2015) analysed the discourse in the blogosphere unravelled by exposure to climate science. Bloggers overtly and aggressively challenged scientific information. Their arguments had a self- sealing character and climaxed in persecution-victimisation attitudes. Counter- arguments were considered proof that something wrong is going on. Likewise, an analysis of pro-conspiracy and anti-conspiracy comments made on a news website regarding 9/11 conspiracy theories revealed further differences in argumentation between the two groups (Wood & Douglas, 2013). Pro-conspiracists were reluctant to label their views as a CT; confirming the social stigma attached. They engaged more in counter-arguing conventional views and less in arguing for their position. Attitude- consistent information consumed from homogenous media outlets actively propagates CI. Substantial reactance is taking place to protect one's attitudes. Pro-conspiracists hunt for anomalies in data and messages, are highly suspiciously minded and harbour substantial prejudice towards non-conspiracists.

Exposure to CTs can have a detrimental effect on social engagement and political involvement, strewing uncertainty and powerlessness. Conspiracy ideation can mobilise aggressive action towards the distrustful elements framed within a CT. Jolley and Douglas (2013) examined the consequences of CT exposure concerning Princess Diana's death and climate change. They found that information supporting the Diana CT led to feelings of disillusionment and lesser intentions to engage in political processes, like voting. Exposure to climate change CTs led to uncertainty towards climate change science and reduced intentions to participate in climate-friendly behaviours. Consequences of the recent G5-COVID-19-conspiracy are heightened suspiciousness and increased destructive behaviours towards G5 telecommunication technology. Jolley and Paterson (2020) found correlations showing that G5-COVID- 19 CI led to increased anger and paranoia and hence participants moderately justified damaging the technology, and developed an increased willingness towards violence. A recent survey in England measured coronavirus CI (Freeman et al., 2020) and found that higher CI was associated with a decreased willingness to comply with government guidelines; such as wearing masks and physical distancing as well as greater reluctance to get tested for COVID-19. Coronavirus CI was high, with 50% of the sample having some, consistent or high levels of CI. Imhoff and Lamberty (2020) also found that CI about COVID-19 being a hoax correlated with reduced containment behaviours. Additionally, when COVID-19 was perceived as human-made and purposely released, people's actions showed an increase in self-centred prepping. These consequences mentioned above exacerbate social dilemmas such as global warming and the COVID-19 pandemic, erode scientific and political trust and endanger compliance with health guidelines and engagement for positive change.

Techniques to counter conspiracy narratives might involve resistance to persuasion and inoculation. Bonetto et al. (2018) primed resistance to persuasion before CI exposure and found that it slightly reduced the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs. Inoculation can protect against persuasive ideas via prior exposure to weaker counter-argument elements of a CT. Jolley and Douglas (2017) explored if anti- conspiracy arguments before and after vaccination CI exposure affected immunisation tentativeness. Only prior pro-vaccination messages were able to reduce successive CI and supported intentions to vaccinate an imaginary child. Established CI is very impervious to inoculation. Educational interventions, forewarning attempts and priming towards resistance might lessen conspiracy beliefs grounded in misinformation if they can be articulated before a new CT rises.

Conspiracy ideation has emerged as a growing research domain within social psychology (Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018). There are many limitations to the articles presented in this literature review, as they often rely on survey studies. A causal link between CI and any personal, social or cultural factors can therefore not be ascertained. Priming studies frequently include university students in labs or are performed online with groups involving quota sampling. Exposure to imagined CTs poses an ethical risk. Imhoff and Lamberty (2017) acknowledged that debriefing did not neutralise a manipulated narrative; 1⁄4 of the participants still held onto the truthfulness of an invented CT.

To conclude, conspiracy ideation is universal and arises in times of societal crisis and uncertainty. Conspiracy theories attempt to depict unfamiliar and threatening information in recognisable social representations. Today, they are widely propagated on social media and aggressively discussed in blogs and other online forums in a self-sealing and biased manner. The social-psychological determinants of conspiracy ideation are ranging from desiring a unique social identity, yet belonging to same ideologic membership groups; these can have a collective narcissism character. Strong polarisation creates a readiness to reject science and harbours prejudice towards non-conspiracy-believers. Conspiracy ideation is stigmatised; social isolation, ostracism and eroding morality further exacerbate conspiracy thinking. Consequences of exposure are feelings of powerlessness and anomie, and subsequently disengagement with health care, political and positive social adaptation. Refutation might include educational efforts to inoculate against a rising conspiracy theory or prepare the society for resistance to persuasion.

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