Paul Feyerabend Would Be Outraged by Conspiracy Theories – or Would He?

 

Philosophical science examines what science is and what it ought to be. But crucially, it also aims to elucidate the ethical and moral implications of science on society and humanity.

During the emergence of Covid-19, conspiracy theories opposed to many facts communicated by scientists and governments. Such as claiming Covid-19 is a hoax, mask- wearing is dangerous or useless, and that vitamin d, hydroxychloroquine, an anti-malarial drug and choline dioxide, basically bleach, would prevent or heal an infection. Throughout subsequent lockdowns and restrictions imposed on the worldwide public, conspiracies arose around a new world order forced by Bill Gates and pharmaceutical companies planning vaccine developments to control the entire world population.

Generally, an overarching theme within many modern conspiracies is a vehement and aggressive denial of science (or parts thereof). Anthropologic global warming and the safety of vaccines have long been hot topics in the conspiracy scene (Goertzel, 2010). It is important to note that conspiracy theories are not a modern-day appearance. They are prevalent repetitively in history and not specific to any culture. Social crises intensify conspiracy ideation as rapid collective change threatens existing social norms, power structures and ecological security.

How would Paul Feyerabend, the epistemological anarchist, respond to the occurring misinformation proliferation? Feyerabend, a philosopher of science, claimed that science needed to be separate from the state, which he called the most dogmatic religion of all time. He was foremost critical of the validity and usability of scientific methods and the role of scientists, assigning them imperialistic motives and stifling rigour. His disparagement of

scientific methods used in science caused a drift away from his earlier friends, co- philosophers and inspirers, namely Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. It earned him the appraisal of being "the worst enemy of science" (Brown & Kidd, 2016).

However, his later lectures and the subsequent book, 'The Tyranny of Science', published from these lectures in 2011, addressed underpinnings that seemed relevant in the public climate that persisted around reservations about genetically modified organisms (GMO) and nuclear science. Feyerabend died in 1994. He missed the advancement of the world wide web, the rise of social media, and the subsequent democratisation of science.

The lectures held by Feyerabend that flowed into "Tyranny of Science" were initially called "Harmony and Conflict "(Kidd, 2011). Later in Feyerabend's career, he became concerned about a disconnect between the public and the science, sparked by ethical alarms, the risk of abuse and misuse of scientific findings and applications, or merely not being in control of powerful mechanisms unveiled by science. Feyerabend was becoming troubled about an ill-informed public and argued that thoughtful philosophical input was needed to soften the conflicts between science and people – to reinstate harmony. Was he trying to undo some of his earlier condemnation of scientific methods? He emphasised that science is a highly complex and dynamic process: phases of conflicts and harmony exist between scientists, philosophers, policymakers, and social groups. Confusions and misperceptions arise from such disputes. Public apprehensions about science not merely oppose scientific truths but invoke judgements about the value, purpose, and meaning of science. We needed to become more particular about how science is communicated. That is where he saw the role of philosophy of science – to translate science anew to the public and address disquiets.

Science today has become a widely democratised enterprise, and genuine debates are welcomed. Scientists acknowledge that scientific issues have widespread consequences; technologically, environmentally and politically. However, the public discussion must follow

the rules of science, even though the parameters seem rigorous. Aggressive and personal denunciation efforts in science denial can have a distressing effect on academics. Besides negatively affecting science communication, debates can cause false consensus effects (a minority thinking they portray the majority of opinions) and influence respectively hinder the course of research, as has undeniably happened with climate change (Levandowsky et al., 2016).

Conspiracy theories aim to explain complex issues by conjuring a simple and certain answer to life's uncertainty. They compound with beliefs in alternative medicine and alternative explanations for scientifically established knowledge. In fact, Feyerabend was critical of the limitations in science by methodological norms and rational values. However, through social media and the dark web, conspiracists reach vast populations and strew doubt, anger and activism against policies, governments and technology. Conspiracy ideation evolves in five stages: (1) 'something is not in order', (2) 'there is more to reality than meets the eye', (3) 'some official narratives are not true', (4) 'all official narratives are illusions' and (5) 'all of reality is an illusion' (Franks et al., 2017). Feyerabend was in favour of open discourse about science and its implications. But how would he respond to the ferociousness of conspiracy ideation that left the peripheries of society and moved mainstream? I suspect he would feel a touch culpable, yet outraged at the same time.

References

Brown, M., & Kidd, I. (2016). Introduction: Reappraising Paul Feyerabend. Studies In History And Philosophy Of Science Part A, 57, 1-8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.11.003

Franks, B., Bangerter, A., Bauer, M., Hall, M., & Noort, M. (2017). Beyond "Monologicality"? Exploring Conspiracist Worldviews. Frontiers In Psychology, 8. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00861

Goertzel, T. (2010). Conspiracy theories in science. EMBO Reports, 11(7), 493-499. https://doi.org/10.1038/embor.2010.84

Kidd, I. (2011). Rethinking Feyerabend: The "Worst Enemy of Science"?. Plos Biology, 9(10). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001166

Lewandowsky, S., Mann, M., Brown, N., & Friedman, H. (2016). Science and the public: Debate, denial, and skepticism. Journal Of Social And Political Psychology, 4(2), 537-553. https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v4i2.604